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This Discussion Paper is concerned with the development of risk-sharing systems for 
health, in low- and middle-income countries. It questions whether insurance theory 
developed in wealthier economies, in particular the central ideas of adverse selection 
and moral hazard, has relevance in the context of poorer countries with high levels of 
unmet health needs, and low utilisation of health services. Empirical evidence on 
these two issues is reviewed, as is the debate around social capital and collective 
action, and its relevance to extending risk sharing in poorer countries. Drawing on 
thinking and evidence from development economics, it is argued that informal risk-
sharing may crowd-out formal risk-sharing schemes, the reverse of arguments found 
in much of the literature. Rooted in a holistic framework of household risk-reducing 
strategies, the paper considers the dynamic of demand for insurance in poorer 
countries, influenced by factors such as social cohesion, perceived corruption, and 
duty to the state. A central argument in the paper is that much of the literature on 
health insurance in low-income countries fails to consider well-developed and highly 





Choices about how to finance health services have become, over the past two 
decades, of primary concern to health policy-makers, and are increasing seen as 
central to achieving broader health policy goals. For example, the choice of financing 
mechanism creates incentives and disincentives for both providers and consumers, 
such as service usage rates across income groups, an issue of major concern in low-
income countries (LICs). The increased attention given to health financing policy has 
been driven, in part, by better information on the magnitude and composition of 
financial resources flowing through health systems. Improved data have exposed the 
dominance of out-of-pocket health expenditures in most low-income countries, one 
implication of which is that access to health care is principally a function of individual 
ability to pay. This fact largely explains observed inequalities in access to services. It 
also suggests that ill health represents a real risk to the maintenance of other 
essential welfare-enhancing consumption expenditures e.g. food and education. 
 
Vietnam, a low-income country, altered the way its public health services were 
funded in the late 1980s, prompted by growing fiscal indebtedness. During 
subsequent economic reforms, agricultural cooperatives, previously the basis for 
funding primary health services, were dismantled, and private financing promoted 
through the introduction of direct patient charges in 1989. This significant policy 
decision reflected a trend towards the reform of health financing strategies in low-
income countries (LICs) (see, for example, the arguments presented by (Akin 1987). 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, concern grew that patients charges 
demanded at the point of service delivery were the cause of reduced service usage 
amongst priority, high need, population groups. Several authors, including 
(Enyimayew and Waddington 1989; Creese 1991; Gilson 1997), produced evidence 
that poor households, in response to user charges, were increasingly turning towards 
self-treatment, and lower-cost health services provided by untrained and unregulated 
practitioners. This shift in treatment-seeking behaviour was exacerbated by the 
ineffectiveness, or non-implementation, of official exemption mechanisms for the 
poor and, possibly, changing perceptions of value for money in government facilities. 
 
Growing evidence that user fee revenues were not translating into quality 
improvements, and were negatively affecting overall welfare levels, exposed the lack 
of risk-sharing within health systems in LICs. In response, international agencies 
such as the WHO (2000) have stated that they consider prepayment schemes, 
including mandatory health insurance, to be the ‘best’ form of health financing. The 
report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health advises governments in 
low-income countries to promote community-financing schemes, in order to facilitate 
risk-pooling amongst poor households (Sachs 2001). 
 
Several ideas and concepts have developed around the current focus on health 
insurance, in particular the more challenging voluntary schemes
1. Models include 
micro-insurance (Dror and Jacquier 1999), community-based health insurance 
(Chabot, Boal et al. 1991; Ron and Kupferman 1996), mutual health organisations 
(Atim 1998; Criel and Van Dormael 1999), and social re-insurance (Dror and Preker 
2002). A primary objective is to increase and protect access to health services, both 
amongst low-income rural populations, and workers in the informal sector (see, for 
example, (Bennett, Creese et al. 1998) and (Preker, Carrin et al. 2001)). 
 
1 As opposed to compulsory schemes that can relatively quickly cover public servants, and 
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This paper presents further conceptual insights into the development of voluntary 
risk-sharing in LICs, using the example of Vietnam. The Vietnamese government 
launched a national Vietnamese Health Insurance scheme, comprising both 
compulsory and voluntary elements, in 1992, three years following the introduction of 
user charges.  
 
In Section 2, prevailing theoretical frameworks of health insurance are examined, 
together with a review of empirical evidence from both rich and poor countries. 
Section 3 presents some conceptual developments in the development of health 
insurance in LICs, whilst Section 4 concludes. 
 
Given the relatively recent introduction of health insurance in most LICs, policy-
makers have little evidence on which to draw i.e. previous successes and failures. In 
many LICs, the decision to introduce health insurance is motivated principally by 
theoretical arguments. Most theoretical frameworks, however, emerged in the context 
of wealthy countries, in which health providers are effectively regulated, and held 
accountable for their actions (see the discussion by Ensor and Witter (2001). It is 
debatable how useful empirical evidence from richer countries is for LICs, given the 
very different structure of health systems, and the institutional and regulatory 
environment within which these function. This issue is revisited in Section 4. 
 
Health insurance builds on the ‘law of large numbers’, which states that the average 
behaviour of a group of individuals is more predictable than that of a single individual 
(Black 1997). In other words, the tendency to behave more systematically and 
predictably increases with the size of the group. This is the rationale for pooling 
individual risks, the key function of an insurance fund, discussed in Section 2.1. The 
health insurance literature, however, is dominated by analysis of two market failures, 
adverse selection (Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.3) and moral hazard (Section 2.2). 
 
2.1  Demand for health insurance 
 
Why does demand for health insurance exist? Besley (1989) provides a theoretical 
framework, drawing on the work of several authors, including Grossman (1972). Just 
as Grossman points out that demand for health services is derived from demand for 
health, demand for health insurance is derived from demand for health services. In 
Besley (1991) framework, demand for health, health services and health insurance 
all build on conventional economic theory of demand. Following this approach, health 
is a commodity traded-off against other goods (e.g. smoking) and, as such, individual 
demand for health can be elicited through an analysis of tastes or preferences. 
 
Besley continues that individuals maximise their utility within budget constraints, 
health being one of the many goods contributing to utility. Better health is achieved 
by investing in goods that improve health, which in turn leads to both a consumption 
gain (i.e. being healthy enables a range of activities to be achieved), and an 
investment gain (i.e. better health increases lifetime earnings). In terms of demand 
for health services, in addition to the influence of income, education, and health 
status, other characteristics such as age, aversion to receiving health care, and the 
availability of health-related information, will each influence demand for health 
services. However, many of these factors are not easily observed. 
 
2. Health insurance: theoretical frameworksCHE Discussion Paper 188  
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Conventional models of demand assume that individuals maximise expected utility, 
within a budget constraint, and according to their preferences. However, in the health 
sector these assumptions do not hold, as information is subject to asymmetry. For 
individuals, uncertainty over the quantity and type of care required, and the need to 
consult a third party who holds the necessary information (i.e. a physician), 
significantly erodes their sovereignty over the consumption decision. This asymmetry 
is the basis of the principal-agent relationship within health care markets. Not only is 
it difficult for individuals to assess the quality of the good or health service before 
receiving it, which is true of many products, but it is also difficult for them to assess 
its quality retrospectively. 
 
2.1.1  Adverse selection - theory 
 
For health insurance markets to spread risks efficiently, several conditions must hold 
true. First, the probability that insured individuals will fall ill must be known, in order to 
allow the insurer to make reasonably accurate predictions about the number and size 
of claims, in a given time period. Secondly, these risks must be largely independent 
of each other. If an event occurs in which all insured individuals, or a significant 
proportion of them, simultaneously suffer an insured loss, the scope for sharing risks 
is severely limited, and the insurance function may collapse. Examples include 
earthquakes, tropical storms, epidemics, and major crop failures; most of which are 
common in LICs. The third condition is that the probability of an individual requiring 
medical treatment must be significantly lower than one (i.e. not certain). For this 
reason, elderly patients often face problems purchasing health insurance, as their 
probability of falling ill tends towards one. 
 
Insurers face problems accurately assessing the first and third condition i.e. the 
likelihood of an individual making a claim. Where the information held by the insured 
and the insurer is asymmetrical, the health insurance market may unravel. Akerlof 
(1970) formalised this phenomenon using the example of second-hand car markets, 
in which the seller holds more accurate information than the buyer about the quality 
of a particular car. The potential buyer cannot easily distinguish between good and 
bad cars and, as a result, prices move towards the average quality of cars in the 
market. In response, owners of good quality cars remove theirs from the market, 
leaving poorer quality cars to dominate.  Prices fall further to reflect lower average 
quality, pushing out more good quality cars, until only low quality cars are traded. 
 
In health insurance markets, the problem is essentially the same, although it is the 
consumer (patient), rather than the seller (insurer), that holds more accurate 
information, in this case about the quality of their own health. If new customers 
provide biased information to the insurer, in favour of good health, the actual number 
of claims and payouts will be higher than predicted. In order to protect profits, the 
insurance agency adjusts premia upwards. Indeed, where the insurer expects new 
customers to provide biased information, the premium may already be loaded, or 
upwardly adjusted. In both cases, individuals in relatively good health may leave the 
market, increasing the average risk of those remaining in the insured pool. Premia 
will rise further in response, increasing the incentive for lower risks to leave the pool, 
and for high-risk individuals to provide biased information about their health in order 
to lower the premium offered to them. A vicious circle of increasing average risk and 
increasing premia ensues. This process of unravelling describes adverse selection, 
which violates the third condition for insurance markets to operate efficiently. 
 
There are two common approaches to setting insurance premia. Profit-maximising 
insurers set premia according to an individual’s health status, adjusting for the 
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same premium to all members, based on the average risk of the group. In this 
approach, individuals in poor health are not excluded, or discriminated against, 
through higher premia, consistent with the policy objective of protecting access to 
services amongst the poor. Adverse selection is more likely to be a problem when all 
consumers face the same premium. Whereas for high-risk individuals a premium 
based on average risk is low, relative to a risk-rated premium, for healthy individuals 
the average premium is relatively high. Individuals with poor health are thus more 
likely to purchase insurance and, where possible, more of it. 
 
To summarise, adverse selection is likely to be a problem in all health insurance 
schemes based on voluntary membership, whether motivated by profit or social 
concerns. In a private market, the insurer may eventually go out of business if 
adverse selection is not dealt with and, typically, will further price discriminate in 
response. In non-profit schemes, such discrimination is rarely used as a policy tool, 
often creating pressures for greater public subsidy. 
 
2.1.2  Adverse selection: evidence from richer countries 
 
Formal tests of adverse selection estimate a demand function for health insurance in 
which health status is incorporated as an explanatory variable; if those in poor health 
are significantly more likely to purchase insurance, this is considered evidence of 
adverse selection. A number of studies conduct such analysis using data from richer 
countries, in which supplementary health services are commonly covered by 
insurance e.g. dental services not financed through general taxation or compulsory 
insurance. Another common benefit is better quality services provided, for example, 
in separate facilities or wards. 
 
Estimating a probabilistic model, Besley, Hall et al. (1999) find that as waiting lists in 
the U.K. National Health Service increase, demand for private health insurance also 
increases. Perceived service quality, measured in terms of waiting times and the 
hotel aspects of health services, are important factors motivating the purchase of 
health insurance. Harmon and Nolan (2001) find similar results in Ireland, where 
insurance purchase is motivated by a demand for service quality, timely access, as 
well as reductions in out-of-pocket expenditures. These studies suggest that health 
insurance purchase is driven more by a taste for quality than by aversion to risk. 
 
In Australia, Cameron et al. (1988) jointly model demand for health care and health 
insurance, the latter using a probit model, and concludes that income is a better 
predictor of health insurance purchase than health status. Cameron and Trivedi 
(1991) provide further evidence that income and price are more important than health 
status in explaining choice of insurance plan. Evidence from the U.K. also supports 
the positive influence of income (Propper 1989; Propper 1993), with political beliefs 
and health status having some, but a less significant, impact.  
 
Further evidence of adverse selection is found by Hopkins and Kidd (1996), in their 
analysis of Medicare in Australia; by Marquis and Phelps (1987), who analyse 
demand for supplementary health insurance in the USA; and by Wolfe and 
Goddeeris (1991), who conclude that the magnitude of adverse selection is unlikely 
to create serious efficiency problems. Rubin and Koelln (1993) find evidence of 
adverse selection using data from the USA, as does Browne (1992). A few studies, 
however, find that health status does not have a statistically significant influence on 
the purchase decision, including Propper (1989; Cameron and Trivedi (1991; Harmon 
and Nolan (2001). Harmon and Nolan (2001) conclude, unexpectedly, that good 
health status is positively associated with probability of purchase, the opposite to CHE Discussion Paper 188  
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theoretical predictions. The authors suggest that further analysis and better data on 
health status is required. 
 
2.1.3  Adverse selection: evidence from poorer countries 
 
Few studies test empirically for adverse selection in health insurance schemes in 
LICs. Two studies examine willingness to pay using contingent valuation techniques. 
In Ghana, willingness to pay for social health insurance increases with income, as 
well as in households with high recent health expenditures and difficulties in making 
payments, (a possible indication of adverse selection). Better education and being 
male also increases the amount people say they are willing to pay (AsensoOkyere et 
al. 1997). In India rural health insurance is linked to private providers, and willingness 
to pay is found to be a function of consumer perceptions of greater inaccessibility, 
and lower quality of government services (Mathiyazhagan 1998). 
 
There is, however, a substantial literature concerned with health insurance more 
generally (Chao; Abel-Smith 1986; Chabot, Boal et al. 1991; Kutzin and Barnum 
1992; Kutzin and Barnum 1992; Bloom 1993; Ensor 1995; Criel 1998; Atim 1999; 
Carrin, DeGraeve et al. 1999; Criel and Van Dormael 1999; Ensor 1999; Ron 1999; 
Soderlund and Hansl 2000; Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002; Carrin 2002). This 
literature does not consider the relevance of the fact that most households in LICs 
operate in the informal economy, and rely on a range of informal risk-sharing 
arrangements to maintain expenditures on essential goods and services, such as 
food, health, and education. Section 3 attempts to do so. 
 




Moral hazard refers to the tendency for insured individuals to increase their 
consumption of health care
2. Pioneering work into this issue was conducted by Arrow 
(1963); Pauly (1968); Pauly (1974); Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000). Cutler and 
Zeckhauser (2000) provide a comprehensive overview of the topic, a central theme 
of which is the conflict between moral hazard, and efficient risk-sharing. 
 
On the demand side, two types of behavioural change may result from insurance. Ex-
ante moral hazard refers to the reduced consumption of preventive care, or changes 
in lifestyle, that result when an individual is insured, increasing the probability they 
will require more expensive curative services. For example, if as a result of being 
insured, an individual feels less worried about the financial implications of falling ill, 
they may decide to forego certain preventive, health-improving actions. Reducing 
consumption of immunisations, for example, significantly increases the risk of illness. 
 
In practice, ex-ante moral hazard is not considered a major problem in the literature, 
however, given that the full costs of not taking care of one’s own health can never be 
fully compensated for by an insurance scheme (i.e. in the case of death, or disability). 
Ex ante moral hazard does exist to some extent as pointed out by Cutler and 
Zeckhauser (2000). Using the example of cigarettes, they expect that consumption 
would fall if individuals faced the full cost of smoking in higher out-of-pocket 
payments. Whereas ex-ante moral hazard refers to the situation prior to an illness 
 
2 Arrow (1985) refers to the less judgmental, and more informative term, hidden action.Theoretical insights into the development of health insurance in low-income countries  8
occurring,  ex-post  moral hazard refers to the increased consumption of health 
services once an individual has already fallen ill. 
 
In health insurance markets, the marginal cost to the patient of accessing care is 
lower than the marginal cost to the provider of supplying care. The insurer pays the 
provider a price, which is sufficient to cover the marginal cost. The extent to which 
the reduced price to the patient leads to increased consumption, depends on the 
extent to which they are price sensitive. In some circumstances, patients may also be 
able to influence the cost of care received, for example by demanding the best 
quality of treatment available. Where increased consumption is considered a 
problem, insurers respond by shifting part of the cost of care back on to the patient, 
for example through co-payments and deductibles. 
 
Referred to in the literature as supplier-induced demand, providers may, for example, 
conduct more diagnostic tests on a patient than might otherwise be considered 
necessary. In higher income countries, one response to this problem has been to 
remove third-party payers, and integrate the insurance and provision functions. In 
many LICs, where the decentralisation process has increased the autonomy of 
individual health facilities, revenue from patient user charges tends to be retained, 
creating an incentive for supplier-induced demand.  Whilst much of the literature 
focuses on the detrimental effect of moral hazard, Zweifel and Manning point out that 
there may also be benefits: 
 
“….. some amount of moral hazard may be deemed beneficial for two 
reasons. First, to the extent that physicians wield a collective monopoly, 
the quantity of medical care consumed falls short of the optimum. The 
increase in quantity caused by the moral hazard effect of insurance can 
be efficiency-enhancing in this situation. Secondly, moral hazard may 
encourage the use of a more cost-effective medical service at the 
expense of a less cost-effective one within an insurance scheme. Thus 
the optimal amount of moral hazard is positive rather than zero.” (Zweifel 
and Manning 2000 :413-4.) 
 
Nyman (1999) argues that, as much necessary care is unaffordable, the purchase of 
health insurance is often simply motivated by a desire to access certain services, 
rather than risk-aversion. Whilst it is debatable how relevant many of these 
theoretical frameworks are for LICs, Nyman’s argument appears particularly relevant, 
given the context of high health needs coupled with low levels of service usage. In 
other words, higher levels of consumption are desirable, and insurance may help to 
generate demand. Careful analysis is required, however, to establish whether or not 
any additional care consumed is necessary. Given these arguments, the central 
conflict between efficiency and risk-sharing which dominates the literature in higher-
income countries, may not of less importance in LICs. 
 
2.2.2  Evidence from richer countries 
 
The most comprehensive analysis of a health insurance scheme is the RAND Health 
Insurance Experiment, conducted between 1974 and 1982, and based on data 
collected from 2005 families in six locations across the USA. In the study, families 
were randomly assigned to fourteen different experimental insurance plans, which 
helped to avoid any bias resulting from self-selection by participants. One of the 
plans provided free access to services and the others a varying degree of cost-
sharing. The study concluded that as the rate of cost-sharing fell, per capita out-of-
pocket payments increased, and calculated a price elasticity of demand of -0.2 for 
outpatient services (Manning, Newhouse et al. 1987). CHE Discussion Paper 188  
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Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) summarise several further studies in the USA, 
concluding that price elasticity of demand ranges from -1.5 to -0.14. Using data from 
Australia, Cameron et al. (1988) find evidence of moral hazard, whilst in Germany 
Geil et al. (1997) conclude that other factors, rather than the incentives resulting from 
insurance, explain rapid increases in demand for inpatient services. Finally, Cameron 
et al. (1988) model demand for health care and health insurance in Australia, where 
joining a private insurance scheme obliges individuals to opt-out of the public 
insurance system. He concludes that health status is more important in determining 
utilisation levels than choice of insurance plan. 
 
In terms of the impact of health insurance on out-of-pocket medical expenditures, 
Newhouse (1993) finds that when health insurance coverage is complete, private 
health expenditures increase by almost 50% relative to those insurance policies 
combined with a large deductible. A similar effect is found by Rubin and Koelln 
(1993) in the USA, which they consider evidence of moral hazard. Using data from 
the Republic of Ireland, Harmon and Nolan (2001) find that being insured under 
Voluntary Health Insurance (which is supplementary to public insurance) increases 
the probability of being admitted to hospital by 3%, relative to those without 
insurance. 
 
2.2.3  Evidence from poorer countries 
 
In Vietnam, analysis of VLSS data by Trivedi (2002), concludes that health insurance 
has a strong positive effect on the use of outpatient services at public hospitals, and 
that income elasticity of demand is 0.4. The analysis is unable to distinguish between 
compulsory and voluntary insured patients, however. Waters (1999) assesses the 
impact of the General Health Insurance scheme for formal sector workers and a 
separate scheme for agricultural workers in rural communities, both in Ecuador. 
Using both univariate and bivariate probit estimators, and correcting for the effect of 
clustering in the sampling framework (i.e. heteroscedasticity), as well as selection 
bias resulting from adverse selection, he finds that being insured has a strong, 
positive, and highly statistically significant effect on the use of curative services, but 
no statistically significant effect on the use of preventive services. He also concludes 
that the scheme increases access to health care for its members but has a negative 
impact on equity overall. The primary reason for this is that insurance coverage tends 
to be for those already in employment, and for whom access is already relatively 
good. 
 
Yip and Berman (2001) analyse the Egyptian School Health Insurance Programme 
(SHIP), which aims to increase access and equity in access to health services. Using 
a logit model and data from a survey of over 10,000 households, insured children are 
found to have a higher probability of seeking outpatient care than the uninsured, in 
particular those in the lowest income quintile. On average, those children enrolled in 
the scheme are 34% more likely to visit a provider than children not in school, and 
9% more likely than those in school but uninsured are. School Health Insurance is 
found to reduce out-of-pocket health expenditures by one half for the middle-income 
group, but only marginally for low and high-income groups. One weakness of the 
study is that the effect of illness severity is not controlled for within the regression 
analysis. 
 
Amongst other empirical evidence not based on econometric analysis, Ron (1999) 
finds some evidence that health care became more affordable for rural families with 
low and unstable incomes, as a result of joining a community health insurance 
scheme. In China, Carrin, Ron et al. (1999) evaluate the extent to which health 
insurance reduced the risk of paying health care bills that would otherwise have been Theoretical insights into the development of health insurance in low-income countries  10
a burden on families. The study concluded that the burden of health care costs on 
families was reduced, but that, in general, this reduction has been modest. In 
Bangladesh, Desmet et al. (1999) highlight the natural link between health insurance 
as a means of spreading the risks of treatment costs, and credit programmes as a 
means of decreasing the relative impact of illness on household income. The authors 
suggest that the credit schemes in which many individuals are already involved may 
provide the entry point for health insurance. Atim (1999) study in sub-Saharan Africa 
concludes that the social movement dimension has little impact on the performance 
of two community-based insurance schemes measured in terms of general 
organisational efficiency, impact on equity in and access to health services, and 
financial performance. Kutzin and Barnum (1992) review insurance schemes in four 
countries, concluding that their impact, in terms of equity and efficiency, has been 
limited. Institutional weakness limits the ability to mitigate incentive problems within 
insurance schemes, often leading to greater income-related inequalities in access to 
health services. 
 
In terms of the effect of health insurance on private health expenditures in LICs, 
Jowett et al. (2003) find, using econometric analysis, that membership in the 
voluntary health insurance scheme organised by the Vietnamese government 
significantly reduces out-of-pocket payments. 
 
Extending risk-sharing in the health sector through compulsion i.e. mandatory 
contributions into a national scheme, a common financing strategy in richer countries, 
is generally not feasible in poorer countries. Limits to extending compulsory 
contributions beyond workers in salaried employment is the focus of analysis by 
Ensor (1999). The ease of registering individuals, assessing income levels, and 
collecting contributions, is estimated using several characteristics, each reflecting the 
structure of a country’s economy and society. These include per capita income 
levels, population density, degree of urbanisation, and the percentage of the labour 
force working in industry. Ensor predicts that Vietnam, which scores low on each 
measure apart from population density, faces significant constraints to extending 
compulsory health insurance nationally. Due to the limitations of compulsion, policy-
makers have turned their attention to the promotion of voluntary mechanisms, 
although almost ten years’ ago, Brian Abel-Smith seriously questioned the potential 
of such schemes, writing that: 
 
‘It has still to be shown that voluntary local prepayment schemes can 
make a major contribution to health financing, except perhaps in a 
coercive political system.’ (Abel-Smith 1994 :174.) 
 
Interestingly, there are anecdotal reports of coercion being used to generate uptake 
of school health insurance in Vietnam, with attempts to enrol entire classes of 
students. Political culture in Vietnam is the product of a series of influences, including 
Confucianism, Communism, and more recently corruption. Each affects the way in 
which insurance is organised, and delivered, and consumer attitudes towards it. 
Beyond the standard expected utility framework, which provides an excellent starting 
point, a range of other factors may be important, in LICs. For example, Sobel (2002) 
notes that ‘When people decide how to behave, they take into account the social, 
economic, and legal implications of their actions. These implications depend on the 
environment in which people make their choices.’ A fuller understanding of individual 
behaviour should thus take into account community levels features. 
 
3.    Extending risk-sharing in LICs: conceptual developmentsCHE Discussion Paper 188  
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3.1  Social capital and collective action 
 
One attempt to develop this idea focuses on the importance of social capital, which, it 
has been suggested, facilitates collective action, which in turn is important for the 
development of health insurance. Theoretical writings claim that informal risk-sharing 
mechanisms are more likely to emerge in communities rich in social capital. Two 
texts, Coleman 1990 and Putnam (1993), argue that the various types of informal 
financial networks widely observed in low and middle-income countries are evidence 
of social capital. Generically referred to as ROSCAs, the authors suggest that such 
arrangements could not exist without spontaneous social solidarity, which can only 
occur in high-trust communities. Social capital, it is argued, is an essential ingredient 
in the evolution of institutions for collective action. Interestingly, Besley (1995), in a 
review of the literature, points out that previous attempts to explain the evolution of 
informal risk-sharing institutions typically ignore the level of social capital in the host 
community. As with many other studies, however, no attempt is made to define social 
capital, and the argument is not developed in any detail. 
 
Clear definitions enable clear measurement. Due to serious definitional problems in 
the social capital literature (see Jowett (2003)), the term currently adds more 
confusion than clarity. Attempts at measurement tend to use one of two approaches. 
The first assesses inter-personal trust in a defined community. The second measures 
social network density, typically through a quantification of membership in voluntary 
associations. This second approach extends from Putnam’s study of regional 
government performance in Italy, in which social capital is equated with civil society
3.
Subsequent studies have attempted to measure not only how connected a person is, 
but also the quality of those connections i.e. their relative contribution to social capital 
(see Narayan and Pritchett (1997) and Grootaert (1999). One criticism of this 
approach is the lack of value given to vertical connections, despite their importance 
for collective action (see Jowett (2002)). Conceptual problems such as these impede 
a clear understanding of what social capital actually is, and a universally accepted 
approached to measurement. In turn, it is not clear whether the term offers any 
original insight, and whether it is of any practical relevance to those formulating 
policy. 
 
Hsiao (1995) draws heavily on Coleman’s work in extending this idea to community-
based health insurance. In doing so, he develops what he refers to as a socio-
economic theory, incorporating both expected utility theory and social theory. Ceteris 
paribus, Hsiao argues that levels of social capital can be used to predict whether risk-
sharing for health will emerge voluntarily. Socially cohesive communities recognise 
the mutual benefits of pooling, and are more likely to 'pull together', in order to make 
a health insurance scheme work. By implication, Hsiao suggests that voluntary risk-
sharing is less likely to emerge in less socially cohesive communities. In the same 
way that Putnam sees ROSCAs as a manifestation of spontaneous risk-sharing in 
high-trust communities, and evidence of collective action, Hsiao views the re-
emergence of cooperative health care organisations in rural China as further 
evidence of social capital. In Hsiao’s initial exploration, the mechanisms through 
which cohesive communities are more prone to collective action are not discussed in 
detail and, as with Coleman’s discussion of ROSCAs, the argument relies on 
assumptions about the effect of community level trust on individual willingness to 
voluntarily enter a risk-sharing agreement. 
 
3 Putnam uses measures such as the density of cooperatives, membership in mutual aid 
societies, and the number of local associations. Theoretical insights into the development of health insurance in low-income countries  12
To the extent that entering a risk-sharing alliance constitutes a risk, and assuming 
most individuals are risk-averse, levels of inter-personal trust in a particular 
community may be important in mitigating perceptions of risk. Essentially, if a person 
is asked to join a risk-sharing arrangement, but she does not fully trust the others 
involved, and their default would have negative implications for her, then she is 
unlikely to consider pooling money with them. Better information about others allows 
a more accurate assessment of the risk involved in entering an informal agreement 
i.e. one not underpinned by a written, legally enforceable contract. Other factors may 
also influence the decision to enter such an agreement, including altruism, and a 
desire to maintain reputation.  
 
It is questionable whether any of the arguments based on community structure are 
relevant in the context of large formal schemes, such as the Vietnamese Health 
Insurance. The institutional design of the scheme (i.e. little community control or 
involvement in decision-making), is such that inter-personal trust at the local level 
would be of less relevance than simple calculations about expected utility. However, 
if a scheme is perceived to be the embodiment of national social solidarity, social 
structure, to the extent that they generate norms of behaviour, may influence uptake, 
even where a scheme is highly centralised. Whilst the sociological literature would 
probably classify feelings of national solidarity as social capital, given the large 
number of ideas bundled into it, the two are clearly not synonymous. 
 
In conclusion, the hypothesis that social cohesion has a positive effect on insurance 
purchase, via collective action, is unlikely to hold true in the context of Vietnamese 
Health Insurance. As Sobel (2002) notes, one of the few benefits of the social capital 
literature is that it has drawn attention to the importance of networks
4. The next 
section reviews frameworks and empirical evidence related to risk in the 
development economics literature. 
 
3.2  Informal risk-sharing and crowding out 
 
For many years, development economists have used risk as a central framework in 
their analysis of welfare. Despite this, health economists concerned with the 
development of health insurance, the primary objective of which is to mitigate the 
negative effect of falling ill on welfare, rarely draw on ideas and empirical evidence 
from the development economics literature. In this literature, risk is conceptualised in 
terms of shocks to consumption expenditures, whether they result from the cost of 
treating an unexpected illness, a poor harvest, or any number of events. Indeed, 
many studies use the example of ill-health as one of the major risks facing individuals 
and households in LICs. 
 
A major focus of this literature is the functioning of informal systems of risk-sharing. 
Besley (1995) draws parallels between risk-sharing and credit, particularly in 
traditional rural communities, given that the latter tends to substitute for insurance 
when market opportunities are limited. For example, an individual may borrow in lieu 
of an insurance payment, and lenders frequently relent on part of a repayment in the 
event of an unforeseeable shock to the borrower. Townsend (1995) points out that 
insurance functions exist both implicitly and explicitly, a useful conceptual separation 
given the wide range of actions that fit into the framework of consumption smoothing, 
or risk-reduction. 
 
4 Social network analysts have already examined the structure of social networks in 
considerably more detail than most studies about social capital, focusing, for example, on the 
relevance of internal structure for collective action (see, for example, Marwell, Oliver et al. 
1988; Gould 1993; Flache and Macy 1996). CHE Discussion Paper 188  
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Most empirical studies conclude that informal risk-sharing is only partial and, hence, 
inefficient (Cox and Jimenez 1992; Grimard 1997; Ligon 2001), a factor likely to 
influence expected utility under formal insurance. Dercon and Krishnan (2002) make 
a similar point in a review of the evidence, concluding that informal risk-sharing 
arrangements provide only limited protection for households, especially for the poor. 
Morduch (1999) questions whether informal insurance can fill the gaps in public 
safety nets, and makes several further points of interest: households with more 
friends (especially richer ones) have greater ability to use informal insurance; public 
transfers pool risks more efficiently than local private arrangements; reciprocal 
transfer systems work best when people have more money; the family is the most 
stable unit for informal insurance (especially in the context of urbanisation etc.); and 
micro-finance programmes directly operated by governments often fail in terms of 
compliance. Morduch also notes that under government schemes, borrowers are 
more likely to default and governments less likely to enforce penalties. 
 
With respect to the importance of community structure for informal risk-sharing, 
parallels can be drawn from a number of studies in the development economics 
literature. Rosenzweig (1988) stresses the importance of kinship ties in sustaining 
information flows, which are crucial to maintaining insurance-based private transfer 
arrangements across space and time. Grimard (1997) provides similar evidence from 
Cote d’Ivoire, and recent work by Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) concludes that 
altruism within families facilitates risk-sharing by overcoming problems of imperfect 
commitment and unenforceable contracts. Interestingly, none of these studies refers 
to social capital. 
 
Several authors (see Attanasio and Rios-Rull (2000), and Attanasio and Rios-Bull 
(2000); Albarran and Attanasio (2002) are concerned that simplistic government 
interventions may crowd out private insurance arrangements, to the extent that 
welfare levels actually decrease, and provide evidence to support this concern. 
Morduch (1999) suggests that by contributing to informal schemes, households may 
actually retard their income growth and social mobility. He claims that overall, despite 
the crowding-out of informal networks, communities tend to benefit from government 
schemes. Furthermore, he argues, some crowding-out of informal networks may be 
necessary to reach the most vulnerable sections within a community.  
 
Informal credit flows within networks of families and friends are essentially what Cox, 
Fetzer et al. (1998) analyse using data from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey 
1992-3, concluding that as private transfers tend to flow into poorer households, in a 
similar way to means-tested public transfers, there is a possibility that the two are 
substitutes, and that the former is crowded out by the latter. They add that, as private 
transfers are widespread in Vietnam, the scope for such crowding-out is substantial. 
In an earlier paper, Cox and Jimenez (1991) categorise private transfers into those 
that are motivated by altruism, and those motivated by exchange. 
 
Evidence that it is informal networks that are crowded out by formal schemes are, 
however, based on evaluations of freely available safety net programmes such as 
direct cash transfers and food aid. In contrast, the decision facing individuals in 
Vietnam is whether to purchase health insurance. The next section asks whether 
informal risk-sharing networks may act as a barrier to uptake of formal health 
insurance. 
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3.3  Might informal risk-sharing crowd out public interventions? 
 
Despite evidence that informal and formal risk-sharing arrangements interact may be 
substitutes, the relevance to policies aimed at promoting voluntary health insurance 
has not previously been considered in the literature. The question for health policy-
makers is, do cohesive social networks lead to the formation of informal financial 
networks, which crowd-out i.e. are preferred to, government promoted health 
insurance? The question seems particularly valid where membership is voluntary, 
and a premium must be paid, in contrast to freely available public safety-net 
schemes. 
 
With respect to corruption, and perceptions of corruption in government institutions, 
there is substantial evidence that this is widespread and in many cases growing in 
many low-income countries, including Vietnam
5. As Hsiao (1995) points out, one 
reason for the collapse of the cooperative health system in China, was excessive 
patronage and corruption. Relatives of officials were frequently included on the 
payroll of health facilities, despite having no qualifications, or indeed not actually 
working there. Hsiao rightly poses the question, why should communities pay 
voluntarily to maintain a corrupt system? An individual who considers others in her 
community to be trustworthy, possibly altruistic, or with whom she has reciprocal 
relationships, may feel such informal support networks to be reliable, and 
immediately available in a time of need. Furthermore, such arrangements may be 
preferable to purchasing government-provided insurance, in particular where 
accountability to clients is perceived as limited or non-existent. 
 
Furthermore, drawing on the broad view of risk and insurance presented by Besley 
(1995), similar strategies may be used to mitigate risk, whatever its cause. Faced 
with user charges in order to obtain health services, households will adopt one, or 
possibly several, of the risk-reducing strategies available to them (assuming that they 
consider it part of their choice-set). Clearly, some households will have more options 
available to them than others. Voluntary health insurance promoted by government 
is, from the perspective of the consumer, one more strategy that can be added to 
their existing portfolio. Viewing demand for health insurance in this way allows it to be 
placed in a more holistic context, enabling the development of a more 
comprehensive, analytical framework. 
 
Table 1 builds on this broader definition of insurance, and presents a range of 
options, or strategies, that households may use to deal with risk i.e. to smooth 
consumption expenditures in the face of a shock. Placed at one end are strategies 
that do not require collective action i.e. voluntary cooperation between individuals. At 
the other end, are actions based on formal, or institutionalised, cooperation such as 
traditional government social security schemes. Some options involve collective 
action organised informally. Formal collective action is defined as that which is 
institutionalised i.e. some form of official membership is required to access benefits. 
Informal collective action thus refers to arrangements between individuals that are 
not anonymous, and require no official membership in an organisation
6.
5 A detailed review of modern Vietnamese society is provided by Templer (1998), who 
devotes considerable space to the issue of corruption in government. 
6 This is similar to the distinction between informal and formal risk-sharing in which the latter 
are defined as agreements that have a money price. CHE Discussion Paper 188  
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Table 1: A framework of risk-reducing strategies 
 
Strategy Details  References 
Self-insurance 
NO COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Self-insurance for those with sufficient income or 
savings. In Vietnam, future health costs are the primary 






lending / loan 
sharks 
NO COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Widely reported in rural communities in low-income 
countries. May form the only source of credit at short 
notice, and tends to be expensive i.e. high interest 




INFORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Particularly important in low-income countries. Primarily 
intra/inter household/familial transfers, but also 
between friends. Can be both financial and non-
financial (e.g. food, clothing, durables, favours). 
Remittances are an example, and are important in 
Vietnam, particularly in the south. May be motivated by 
altruism or self-interested exchange. 
 
.Rosenzweig 1988; 
Cox and Jimenez 
1991; Cox, Fetzer 





INFORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Informal credit is most commonly found in the form of 
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs). 
Credit performs an insurance function by allowing 
consumption to remain smooth in the face of ‘shocks’. 
Besley, Coate et 





Guilds / loan 




FORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Range of institutions from guilds in 14
th century Europe, 
to credit cooperatives in mid-19
th century Germany, and 
loan funds in Ireland around the same time. Micro-
credit organisations can be found in most low-income 
countries today e.g. the Grameen Bank. In many rich 
countries, such as Ireland, the popularity of credit 
unions is increasing, again in response to the failure of 
banks to provide credit to poorer individuals. Member 
organisations of the Irish League of Credit Union, for 
example, tend to have a common bond e.g. living in the 












FORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Range from public safety net programmes (e.g. cash or 






FORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Provide loans / credit at relatively low interest rates. 
Examples include Agricultural Banks such as those in 
Europe in the mid-19
th century. Also widespread in 




Besley, Coate et 
al. 1994; Besley 
and Coate 1995. 
Commercial 
bank loans 
FORMAL COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Commercial banks, charging higher interest rates than 
development banks. Tend to be a feature of 
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At one end of the spectrum, individuals self-insure with savings. If an individual’s 
level of income, or savings, is sufficient to self-insure e.g. to pay full user charges for 
health services, then the need to enter reciprocal or similar arrangements with other 
individuals diminishes. Expectations that collective action is less pervasive in 
wealthier communities are based on this observation, even if empirical evidence is 
mixed. At the opposite end of the spectrum are commercial bank loans, a common 
arrangement in wealthier, modern economies. Whilst borrowing from a commercial 
bank is a form of collective action, in that one individual makes an agreement with 
another individual or, in this case, an institution, this is a formal arrangement. As with 
development banks and formal, compulsory insurance schemes, community 
structure is largely irrelevant with respect to whether an individual is eligible to enter 
such an agreement. It is argued, however, that community social structure is 
important for the development of risk-sharing based on informal collective action, and 
helps to explain why such institutions emerge in certain communities but not others. 
One consistent theme in the sociological literature is that favours, private transfers, 
and the various ROSCA type organisations cited by various authors, tend to flourish 
in communities with a strong degree of network closure. For individuals living such a 
community, it is likely that the number of risk-mitigating options available to them will 
be greater, ceteris paribus, than for individuals living within non-closed networks. 
 
Support for the idea that informal financial networks may actually crowd out formal 
insurance, the opposite to most predictions, is provided by Rosenzweig (1988), who 
reports that in India formal credit is seen as inferior to familial transfers and self-
insurance. There is however, little evidence of this effect elsewhere, largely as this is 
an under-researched issue. It is unlikely that formal insurance will completely crowd 
out informal insurance, or vice versa - the most probable outcome lies between these 
two positions, with formal and informal mechanisms co-existing, and the balance 
between them shifting over time. Levenson and Besley (1996) provide some 
evidence from Taiwan to support this, and is consistent with the idea that individuals 
effectively move up and down the continuum presented in Table 1. 
 
In this framework, expected utility under government health insurance (formal 
collective action), which must be purchased, may be lower than that under the private 
financial networks (informal collective action). Expected utility under formal health 
insurance may reduce, for example, as the number of alternative risk-reducing 
strategies available increases. Bringing together these various ideas, Figure 1 shows 
the range of possible outcomes when formal health insurance is introduced into a 
highly socially cohesive community, with a dense network of informal risk-sharing. 
The figure incorporates the expected effect of perceived corruption amongst 
government officials, as well as a sense of duty to the State, a unique feature of 
Confucian doctrine, which maintains an important influence in Vietnamese culture. 
Uptake of insurance is expected to be relatively high in communities perceiving there 
to be benefits from joining a formal health insurance scheme, having trust in 
government, and having a sense of duty to the State (represented by the extreme 
left-hand side of the diagram). In contrast, where the benefits of the scheme are 
perceived to be low, government officials are seen as corrupt, and there is little sense 
of duty to the State, then uptake will be relatively low (represented by the extreme 
right-hand side of the diagram). The six outcomes between the two extremes are a 
function of the interplay between perceptions of corruption and duty to schemes 
implemented by government. Where both are negative, or positive, then a definite 
outcome is expected. However, where one is positive but the other negative the 
outcome is ambiguous – the one exception is where benefits are perceived and there 
is trust in government. By incorporating duty into the framework, a fundamental 
concept in Confucian doctrine, the model of expected utility can be extended. Rather 
than predicting purchase of health insurance only if expected utility is greater than CHE Discussion Paper 188  
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under informal risk-sharing arrangements, duty may generate demand even where 
the perceived benefits are low, or where there is little trust in government. The 
relationship between duty and trust, however, requires further research. An 
alternative view, for which the evidence from Taiwan offers some support, is that 
formal and informal risk-sharing arrangements are complements rather than 
substitutes. 
 
In summary, the purchase decision of a risk-averse individual, in a low-income 
country such as Vietnam, will be influenced by the availability of alternative risk-
sharing mechanisms, and the expected utility under each. Dense social networks 
may increase the portfolio of options available, through willingness to trust others and 
enter risk-sharing arrangements. Hence, individuals living in communities rich in 
social capital will probably have a broader set of risk-sharing strategies on which they 
can draw. Finally, perceptions of corruption, and a sense of duty to the State, may 
also influence an individual’s decision to purchase health insurance. Figure 2 
attempts to summarise the ideas presented in this section, by incorporating the 
possible influences of perceptions of corruption amongst government officials, and a 
sense of duty amongst the population to the State and its programmes, on demand 
for voluntary health insurance. 
 
3.2  Mitigating market failures 
 
In certain social contexts, information asymmetry within insurance markets may be 
mitigated, without recourse to the collection of large quantities of data, a major 
activity and expense for commercial insurers. Evidence of this is available from group 
lending schemes and informal insurance mechanisms such as rotating savings and 
credit associations, in which members tend to have good information about each 
others actions. This is particularly the case in traditional, pre-industrial societies, and 
is an issue investigated by Wydick (1999), who asks whether social cohesion can 
repair market failure (i.e. moral hazard) in a group lending scheme in Guatemala. He 
finds that better repayment performance results not from stronger social ties between 
members, but primarily from peer monitoring, the use of sanctions against poor 
performers, and intra-group insurance, which assists borrowers who are victims of 
unavoidable mishaps. 
 
The information asymmetry, which limits the ability of formal institutions to monitor 
contracts, is the reasons for the use of peer monitoring in many group-lending 
schemes, such as the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, whose clients typically have 
insufficient physical collateral to secure loans from traditional banks. Arnott and 
Stiglitz (1991) find evidence that peer monitoring mitigates moral hazard, as do 
Besley and Coate (1995). The second key advantage of informal institutional 
arrangements lies in their ability to enforce contracts through the threat and use of 
social sanctions, for example by banning an individual who reneges on an 
agreement, from future risk-sharing alliances (Besley and Coate 1995). CHE Discussion Paper 188  
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Dufwenberg and Lundholm (2001) idea of a per capita externality is useful here. 
Where an insurance scheme is locally organised, in terms of fund pooling and 
management, the per  capita externality of another person reneging on their contract, 
or using health services unnecessarily is likely to be relatively high. In the case of 
voluntary health insurance in Vietnam, management and policy decisions are 
relatively centralised, and risk-sharing takes place at the provincial level. Under this 
scenario, the per capita externality of another person’s inappropriate behaviour is 
very low. In other words, it is unlikely that one member would view what she thought 
to be the inappropriate use of health services by another member, as having a 
negative consequence for herself. If, however, the per capita externality of misuse by 
another is perceived to be considerable, or if such behaviour is deemed immoral, 
then highly cohesive communities may be less likely to suffer from moral hazard 
problems under insurance. 
 
Following the transition from health services provided free at the point of service, to 
the introduction of user charges, health insurance is now high on the policy agenda in 
low-income countries. Whilst user charges were introduced primarily as a response 
to financial sustainability concerns, interest in health insurance is driven more by a 
concern over income-related inequalities in access to services. However, the 
widespread introduction of health insurance schemes is motivated primarily by 
theoretical frameworks, which evolved in the context of wealthy countries. The 
structure of economy and society in low-income countries tends to be very different, 
for example in terms of the extent of informal activity, subsistence agriculture, 
relatively closed traditional communities, and the effective regulation of health 
professionals. It is debatable how relevant these frameworks are. 
 
This paper reviews the main theoretical frameworks found in the literature, and 
reflects this by paying particular attention to adverse selection and moral hazard, two 
issues that dominate. Empirical evidence is also reviewed. In terms of the relevance 
of these frameworks to low-income countries, whereas adverse selection appears to 
maintain its validity across economic and social contexts, for moral hazard this is less 
so. In the context of most low-income countries, where levels of unmet health needs 
tend to be substantial, increased in consumption are not necessarily problematic. 
 
One of the key issues facing the development of health insurance in low-income 
countries is the extension of risk-sharing beyond those in formal employment. For 
this reason, there is a particular interest in schemes based on voluntary membership, 
and the suggestion has been made that communities rich in social capital are more 
likely to join collective endeavours such as risk-sharing. This idea is further explored 
in this paper, in particular those based on closure in social networks, and its 
importance for information and individual behaviour. It is suggested that whilst high-
trust communities may be more likely to develop risk-sharing arrangements, which 
tend to be informal, these networks may act as a barrier to uptake of formal 
government-organised health insurance. Furthermore, this argument is more likely to 
hold true where corrupt is perceived to be widespread in government, as is the case 
in many low-income countries.  
 
Finally, the issues discussed in this paper highlight the fact that current conceptual 
frameworks informing the development of health insurance in low-income countries, 
can benefit considerably from ideas and empirical evidence from other disciplines, in 
particular sociology and development economics. A rich research agenda lies ahead. 
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